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The Times Are They a-Changin'?: What Kivalina Says About the
State of Environmental "Political Questions"'
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.2
I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2010, the Washington D.C. area experienced a record-
setting series of snowstorms.3  Dubbed the Snowmaggedon, the storms
shut down the Federal government for almost a week.4  For many, the
shutdown was symbolic of the frustration the nation experiences with
today's political process in D.C., as many believe Washington is "broken"
and nothing meaningful is ever accomplished. This current sentiment is
especially frustrating when interested citizens advocate for certain policies
and laws that are considered political in nature and therefore can only be
decided by Congress or the Executive Branch.
1 First released in January 1964, "The Times They Are a-Changin"' by Bob Dylan
headlined his third album of the same name. The song would quickly become an anthem
for the Civil Rights Movement and gave voice to the emotion within the Movement. SEE
BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are a-Changin', on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN'
(Columbia Records 1964).
2 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
3 Just to give a few statistics, Washington D.C. National Airport saw 55.9 inches of snow
on the ground and Washington D.C. Dulles Airport experienced 72.8 inches of snow.




4 Snowmaggedon emerged out of many candidates as the "official" nickname for the
snowstorm when President Obama used the term during a Question and Answer session.
'Snowmaggedon': Obama names Blizzard, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 2, 2010,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/06/snowmageddon-obama-names-
n 452204.html.
To highlight one example of the public's disproval, a March 18 Gallup poll (for
reference, this was before the healthcare bills were passed) showed that only 16% of the
public approved of Congress's job performance. Jeffrey M. Jones, Obama's Approval
Rating Lowest Yet, Congress'Declines, March 18, 2010,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 26809/Obama-Approval-Rating-Lowest-Yet-Congress-
Declines.aspx.
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At times, this gridlock in deciding political issues results in
interested citizens becoming plaintiffs seeking to adjudicate their
grievances in court. Two such issues that have become adjudicated
grievances - who bears the cost of harms resulting from global warming,
and its derivative, whether oil companies should be found liable for
melting ice caps - have proven to be particularly troublesome for plaintiffs
seeking to bring suit against oil companies subsequently responsible for
greenhouse gas emissions.6 This Note explores how the political question
doctrine7 affects plaintiffs seeking to bring suit for damages caused by
global warming.
The political question doctrine, first articulated by the Supreme
Court in the holding and dictum of Marbury v. Madison, has prevented
questions that are political in nature or exclusively allocated to the
Executive or Legislative Branch by the Constitution from being decided in
the Judiciary.8 By examining the 2009 case Native Village of Kivalina v.
ExxonMobil Corp. ("Kivalina"), this Note shows how the evolution of the
political question doctrine has subsequently left global warming plaintiffs
with very few avenues for relief.
6 Three cases, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y.
2005)), Comer v. Murphy Oil, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), and California v. General
Motors, No. C06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) have been
brought by plaintiffs for global warming harms. All of these cases were dismissed in
lower courts due to the plaintiff presenting nonjusticiable political questions. As
discussed in Part III D, the cases met different fates upon appeal.
7 Professor Barkow comprehensively explains both the political question doctrine and
how the parameters of the doctrine were formed in her Columbia Law Review article.
Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall ofthe Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise ofJudicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 239 (2002) ("In
Marbury [referring to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)], Chief Justice Marshall
acknowledged the existence of certain questions that are wholly outside the purview of
the courts -- 'questions, in their nature political.' [T]his reference ... reveals Marshall's
fundamental conception of the separation of powers and highlights both the limits of
judicial authority and the interpretative role played by the political branches." Id
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)).
8 See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170. This is not to say that the aspects of those issues, such as
whether the questions were decided in a constitutionally consistent manner, are not
judicially reviewable. The political question doctrine only attempts to ensure that the
judiciary does not create policy or infringe upon the other branch's powers.
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Two conclusions are reached through this Note's analysis of the
Kivalina decision. First, although the political question doctrine is
essential to the preservation of our democracy through continued
separation of powers within the federal government, the jurisprudence of
the political question doctrine, when coupled with the current political
climate, leaves environmental advocate litigants with little hope for an
adequate remedy to redress their harm. Second, and perhaps more
important to the future of global warming suits, this Note analyzes
Kivalina's holding to provide a judicial framework plaintiffs might use to
overcome the political question doctrine and bring suit for global warming
claims.
1I. FACTS AND HOLDING
The village of Kivalina ("Kivalina" or "the Village") is a self-
governing Eskimo tribe located in Alaska along a six-mile long barrier
reef approximately 70 miles north of the Arctic Circle.9 The coastline of
the Village is protected by Arctic sea ice ("the ice") that acts as a shield
for Kivalina during coastal storms and their potentially damaging waves.lo
However, as a result of global warming, the sea ice attaches to Kivalina
later in the year, breaks up earlier, and is thinner and less extensive. 1
Due to the erosion and destruction of the Arctic sea ice protecting
the Village, Kivalina brought suit against 24 oil, energy, and utility
companies, one of which is ExxonMobil Corporation ("Defendants").12 In
seeking relief under the federal common law claim of nuisance, Kivalina
asserted that the Defendants contributed to the emission of greenhouse
gases, which caused global warming, which in turn caused the melting of
the ice.13  Specifically, the Village stated that the buildup of carbon
dioxide and methane (conditions that cause global warming) are human
made and attributable to increases in the combustion of fossil fuels, fuel








Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 17, No. 3
harvesting, coal mining and oil drilling.14  All of these activities are
associated with the Defendants' businesses.
In granting the Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, the court held that the Plaintiffs claims were not justiciable
under the political question doctrine and the Plaintiff did not have Article
III standing to bring the claim.' 5  Additionally, the Plaintiffs state law
claims were dismissed without prejudice in order to allow the Plaintiff to
re-file in state court.' 6
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Legal Standard for Federal Court's Jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction that possess only
those powers authorized by the Constitution and Congressional statutes.' 7
Therefore, in cases before a federal court, the court presumes that it lacks
jurisdiction unless the record shows the contrary to be true.' 8 Consistent
with this premise, federal circuit courts, including the Ninth Circuit, hold
that the plaintiff has the burden to prove jurisdiction in order to survive a
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.19
Additionally, if at any time the court finds that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.20
B. The Political Question Doctrine
Some disputes involving political questions lie outside of the
Article III requirement that judicial power is only vested in deciding cases
14 Id. at 869.
s Id.at 883.
16 Id. at 882-83.
17 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006) (quoting Renne v.
Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991)).
19 Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 870.
20 FED. R. CIv. P. 12(h)(3).
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and controversies.21 To determine whether the political question at issue
is nonjusticiable, a court must determine whether or not the dispute
requires the court to "make a policy judgment of a legislature rather than
resolving a dispute through legal and factual analysis." 2
The Baker test, as articulated in Baker v. Carr, sets forth six
independent factors that demonstrate the presence of a nonjusticiable
political question.23 If any of the six factors are found, the dispute is not
within the court's jurisdiction. The factors are as follows: 24
1. A textually demonstrable constitutional commitment to another
political branch.
2. A lack of judicially discoverable or manageable standards for
the court to resolve the issue.
3. The impossibility of deciding the issue without making an
initial policy determination that is of nonjudicial discretion.
4. The impossibility of undertaking the issue without expressing a
lack of respect to another branch.
5. An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a prior
political decision on the issue.
6. The potential for embarrassment from multiple
pronouncements on one question at issue.
25The six Baker factors are traditionally grouped into three categories.
Factor 1 is grouped into Category 1 and is characterized as an inquiry into
whether the issue is Constitutionally committed by text to another
branch.26 Factors 2 and 3 are grouped into Category 2 and are an inquiry
into whether the resolution of the question would demand the court to
move beyond judicial expertise.27 Finally, Factors 4-6 are grouped into
21 Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 980 (9th Cir. 2007); U.S. CONST., art. III § 2,
cl. 1.2 2 Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 876 (quoting EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal Co., 400
F.3d 774, 784 (9thCir. 2005).
23 Id. at 871 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962)).
2 4 Id. at 871-872 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962)).
25 Id. at 872 (quoting Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 995 (9th Cir. 2005).
26 Id. (internal citation and quotations omitted).
2 7 Id. at 873 (quoting Wang, 416 F.3d at 996).
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Category 3 and inquire into whether prudential considerations counsel
against judicial intervention. 2 8 Given Kivalina's holding, only Categories
1 and 2 will be covered in this Note.
1. Category 1 - Textual Commitment
Under a textual commitment examination, courts look to determine
whether the decision at hand has been exclusively committed to either the
legislative or the executive branch of the federal government. 29 This is
determined by looking to whether the Constitution has given one of the
political branches final responsibility for interpreting the scope and nature
of the question at issue.30
2. Category 2 - The Scope of Judicial Expertise
a. Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards
In determining whether a case is manageable, courts consider
whether or not there are legal tools that allow a ruling that is principled,
rational, and most importantly reasoned.3' If there are no cases that
provide guidance to reach a resolution in a reasoned manner, the courts
will defer judgment to another branch.32
b. Initial Policy Determination
In assessing whether a policy judgment of a legislative nature
exists, the chief inquiry looks to whether the court removes "an important
policy determination from the Legislature." 33 The crux of this inquiry
28 Id. at 872 (quoting Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 980 (9th Cir. 2007)).
29 Id. (quoting McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1358-59 (11th Cir.
2007).
30 Id. (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 240 (1993)).
31 Id. at 874 (quoting Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 552 (9th Cir. 2005)).32 Id. (citing Alperin, 410 F.3d at 552).
33 Id. at 876 (quoting EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal Co., 400 F.3d 774, 784 (9th Cir.
2005); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 438 F. Supp. 2d 291, 297
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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rests on whether a court subsequently decides an issue based on a
determination not through legal and factual analysis but through a decision
as to what is the best policy.
C. The Tort ofPublic Nuisance
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821 (b)(1), a
public nuisance is "an unreasonable interference with a right common to
the general public." 34 Unreasonableness is determined by weighing the
gravity of harm with the utility of conduct. 35  This determination is
examined through a "reasonable person" standard, meaning whether the
interference was reasonable when looking at the situation as a whole,
impartially, and objectively. 36  Applying these standards, in cases
involving energy sources, possible alternatives, and any "alleged" damage
that the consumption of those energy sources "caused", a fact finder must
weigh the energy source against its alternatives. 37 Specifically, the fact
finder must weigh the energy producing alternatives to the energy source
in question, their reliability as energy sources, safety considerations, and
the im act of those alternatives on both consumers and businesses at every
level.
D. Recent Political Question and Public Nuisance Court Decisions in the
Environmental Law Field
To date, three other global warming cases were filed against
defendants in the car and energy industry that invoked political question
analyses. 39  These cases, Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.
34 Id. at 874 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821(b)(1) (1979)).
35 id.
36 People ex. rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1105 (Cal. 1997) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826-3 1).
3 7 Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 874-75 (citing California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-
05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 at *8 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 17, 2007)).
38 id.
3 Maria V. Gillen, The Rebirth ofthe Political Question Doctrine, 23 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV'T 23, 25 (2008).
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("AEP") 40, California v. General Motors, Co. ("GM')4 1, and Comer v.
Murphy Oil ("Comer")42 were all dismissed in circuit courts for presenting
a nonjusticiable political question and subsequently met different results
43on appeal.
First filed in 2004, AEP 44 was the first global warming case
dismissed as being a nonjusticiable political question.4 5 The plaintiffs,
several political subdivisions and environmental organizations who
brought suit against coal burning power companies for the common law
tort of public nuisance, timely appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.4 6  The two-judge panel47 proceeded
through a 90-page analysis of the issues and focused most of its time on
the political question Baker factors.48 The court found that the first,
second, and third Baker factors did not apply, as (1) no textual
commitment in the Constitution exists to grant the Executive or
Legislative branch sole responsibility to resolve conflicts alleging carbon
dioxide emissions causing harm and (2 and 3) judicial standards of a
public nuisance tort suit exist to obviate the need for initial policy
determinations 49 Concerning the third through sixth factors, the Court
asserted that judicial adjudication would not contradict prior decisions and
seriously interfere with governmental interests.5 0  As a result of their
analysis, the court held that the district court erred in dismissing the
40 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
4' No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
42 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009).
43 Gillen, supra note 39, at 23.
" 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
45 Gillen, supra note 39, at 24. As will be more fully explained in the following
paragraphs, each case has a differing final decision. AEP was reversed and remanded in
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. A re-hearing in banc was granted in Comer
(pending case citation: 2010 WL 685796 (S.D. Miss.)) and General Motors granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss.
46 Connecticut v. Amer. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 320 (2d Cir. 2009).
47 Of note, Justice Sotomayor was originally the third member of the panel but was
subsequently elevated to the U.S. Supreme Court on August 8, 2009. 582 F.3d at 313.
48 See id. at 321-32.
49 Id at 325, 329-31.
s0Id. at 331-32.
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plaintiffs greenhouse gas public nuisance claims as a nonjusticiable
political question and remanded the case for further proceedings.5 1
Next, in 2006 the State of California brought suit aainst
automakers in GM for creating and contributing to global warming.' The
plaintiff brought forth both federal and state common law nuisance tort
claims, stating that the defendants created and maintained a public
nuisance due to the pollution, and subsequent global warming, caused by
their products. 53  Using the Baker analysis to determine whether the
plaintiffs claims were nonjusticiable, the court mainly focused on the
second and third factors. The court's analysis of the third factor focused
on what policy determinations, if any, were necessary in adjudicating a
global warming claim. 54 Drawing from case law55 , the court determined
that the essence of the plaintiffs claims, who bears the cost of global
warming due to carbon dioxide emissions from the defendant, was a
policy determination that precedent dictated as nonjusticiable.56 Building
off that determination, the court's analysis of the second factor determined
that there was a lack of judicially manageable or discoverable standards to
resolve the plaintiffs claim.57  Specifically, the court reasoned that the
scope of inquiry for the public nuisance tort associated with global
warming is well beyond standards found in prior case law and therefore
there is no judicial guidepost to aid the court in adjudication. Given
51 Id. at 392-93. The court also found that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the suit. Id.
52 California v. Gen. Motors, Co., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
1 Id. at *2.
54 Id. at *6.
ss The court primarily used two cases to support its conclusion. First, the court mirrored
the language of the lower court decision in AEP: "In AEP, the court rejected a similar
global warming nuisance claim finding that resolution of the issues required "an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion." Id. at *7 (quoting AEP,
406 F. Supp. 2d 272, 274). Second, the court discussed the implications of
Massachusetts v. EPA's holding - that authority to make conclusions determining the
standards of carbon dioxide emissions lie within the political branches - to show that
Supreme Court precedent existed to classify the plaintiff's claim as a policy
determination. Id. at * 12 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007)).
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these determinations, the court dismissed the plaintiffs claims as
nonjusticiable.59
Finally, Comer, a case originally filed in 2005 but decided in the
appellate court in 2009, concerned a class action suit filed by property
owners along the Mississippi Gulf coast against energy, chemical, and
fossil fuel industry corporations operating in the area for, among other
legal causes of action, the tort of public nuisance. 60  The plaintiffs'
complaint was that the corporations' activities increased the global water
and air temperatures, which in turn increased the ferocity of Hurricane
Katrina, which caused the destruction of the plaintiffs' property.61
Although legal precedent existed in GM favorable to the defendants'
theory of dismissal, the court stated that these cases were "legally flawed
and clearly distinguishable" from Comer.62 The Comer court first found
that the GM case misread the Chevron test and subsequently erred in
stating that an impermissible balancing of social and economic interests,
akin to the tasks done by a legislative body, must occur.63  The court
contended that this serious misinterpretation of law allowed the GM Court
to erroneously assume that they would have to imitate the functions of the
legislative or regulatory bodies. 64 The Comer court stated that this false
premise led the GM court to conclude that the case before it was a
9 Id. at *16.
60 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009).
61 Id. at 859.
62 Id. at 876. Note that the Comer Court also stated that the AEP decision was erroneous
in logic. Id. They are correct, as they are referring to the district court decision that was
subsequently overturned by the AEP case discussed immediately above. Id.; Connecticut
v. Amer. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev'd, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir.
2009).
63 Id. The Chevron test is referring to the Chevron deference test found in Chevron
US.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Def Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Gellhom and
Levin's ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL describes the Chevron test
as two inquiries the court should look into when reviewing an agency's administration of
a statute. ERNEST GELHORN & RONALD M. LEvIN, ADMINSTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS
IN A NUTSHELL 81 (Thomson West 2006). The first inquiry is whether "Congress has
directly addressed the precise question at issue." Id. If this has occurred, the court must
give effect to Congressional intent, if it is unambiguous. Id. The second inquiry, dealing
with situations where the statute is silent or ambiguous to the specific issue, mandates
that the court should accept the agency's action if it is a reasonable interpretation. Id
6 Comer, 585 F.3d at 877.
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nonjusticiable political question.65 Second, the Comer court questioned
the GM Court's application of the political question doctrine concerning
whether or not public nuisance suits were preempted by federal and state
regulatory statutes.66 The Comer court went on to clarify that the federal
preemption was inapplicable in this case and there also was not
preemption against a state bringing a public nuisance suit.67  With this
analysis in mind, the Comer court held that the plaintiffs did not present a
nonjustiticable political question and remanded the case for a re-hearing in
banc.68
E. Article III Standing
Article III standing is a threshold question concerning whether a
party has jurisdiction in a federal court. 69 The party invoking jurisdiction
has the burden of establishing the minimum requirements for standing. 70
In setting out the Supreme Court's modern test for standing, Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife stated that to establish standing, a petitioner must
demonstrate (1) particularized injury occurred, (2) the injury was caused
by and is fairly traceable to the act challenged, and (3) that the injury can
be redressed by the court.7 Injury is established when a party
demonstrates that it has suffered an injury that affects it in an individual
way.72 Additionally, an alleged injury must be actual or imminent, not
hypothetical, and also can be generalized so long as the injury was
concrete. 73 Therefore, in environmental injury cases, a plaintiff can have
standing if an environmental harm occurred and caused injury to the
plaintiff.74
65 Id.
6 6Id. at 877-78.
Id. at 879.68 Id. at 880. During the re-hearing, the 5 Circuit was unable to hold a quorum ofjudges
to hear the case. Due to this, the case has subsequently been dismissed. Comer v.
Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2009).
69 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992).
o Id. at 560-61.
71 Id.
721 Id. at 560.
7 Id.; FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998).
74 Fla. Aubudon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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Turning to the causation requirement, a plaintiff must show that
the injury is fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant.7' This
traceability is shown by demonstrating a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct of the defendant, without the presence of a third
76party or independent action intervening. Article III requires a substantial
likelihood level of proof that the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiffs
injury.n Therefore, in situations where procedural standing is in question
(a theory that grants standing based on congressionally prescribed
standards), the substantial likelihood level of proof is met when the
defendant exceeds the congressionally prescribed limit.78
Finally, for an injury to be fairly traceable, a distinction must exist
between plaintiffs who lie within a zone of discharge of the defendant and
those individuals who lie too far from the zone of discharge to be fairly
traced to the defendant. 79  The zone of discharge requirement is, in
essence, a test as to whether or not the chain of causation is too attenuated,
either in location or time.80
F. "Special Solitude" under Article III Standing
After the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,
parties and courts have read Massachusetts's holding as granting a
7 Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 877 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997)).76 Id. (quoting Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220, 1227
(9th Cir. 2008)). This standard speaks to the possibilities of a contribution or seed of
injury theory for recovery. In essence, the injury must be directly related to the
defendant's actions. Therefore, the injury cannot be due to contributions from the
defendant's actions or actions caused by a defendant or from a multitude of other
?ossible defendants.Id. at 878 (quoting Habecker v. Town of Estes Park, Colo., 518 F.3d 1217, 1225 (10th
Cir. 2008)).78 Id. at 879 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d
149, 172-173 (4th Cir. 2000)).
79 Id. at 881 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. 95 F.3d
358, 361 (5th Cir.1996)).
o Id. at 881-82 (citing Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 563 F.3d
466, 478 (D.C. Cir 2009)).
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"relaxed" standing requirement to sovereigns.8 ' This "special solitude"
requirement is given to entities when federal procedural rights exist to
protect certain rights a state had to surrender upon entering the Union.82
The sovereign entity can challenge a federal government entity, in
Massachusetts' case the EPA, to determine if the federal government
action was arbitrary and capricious.83
IV. INSTANT DECISION
Writing for the court, Judge Saundra Brown granted the
Defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
dismissed without prejudice Kivalina's state claims for re-filing in
California state court. The opinion examined the two theories for
dismissal that the Defendants brought forth; dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and dismissal for lack of standing.
A. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
- The Political Question Doctrine
The court first assessed whether Kivalina's claims were outside the
Article III jurisdiction of federal courts and therefore nonjusticiable."
Relying on two general analysis tools derived from the six Baker factors to
determine whether Kivalina's claims were political questions,86 the court
determined that Kivalina's complaints were better suited for the
Legislative or Executive Branch.
1 The Massachusetts v. EPA decision was interpreted as a relaxed standard due to the
special solitude requirement in Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Dept. ofInterior. 563 F.3d
466 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The language for the Biological Diversity decision was inspired by
the lower court's dissenting opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA and the Supreme Court's
dissent in Massachusetts v. EPA. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir.
2006); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534-60 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.; Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
82 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519-20.
8 Id. at 520.
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In addressing the first inquiry, whether a textual commitment to
the issue is present, the court stated that the threshold issue is whether the
Constitution allocates final responsibility to one of the political branches.8 7
In denying the Defendants' arguments that Kivalina's claims touched on
foreign policy and therefore were nonjusticiable, the court held that the
first Baker factor was not implicated.8 8 Although the court acknowledged
the international nature of Kivalina's claims, and particularly the
implication that Kivalina's emission cap argument carries for U.S. foreign
policy, the Defendants failed to point to any provision in the Constitution
showing the claim's determinations were vested not in the Judicial Branch
but with another branch. 89  Therefore, the court presumed that no
limitations existed and the Judicial Branch was able to hear Kivalina's
claims.9 0
Turning to the second inquiry, whether a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards existed to make an initial policy
decision determination unavoidable, the court broke its analysis into two
prongs.9 1 First, in examining whether judicially discoverable and
manageable standards existed, the court held that given the scale of
liability Kivalina sought to impose, there were no standards in case law
that would aid the court to reach a resolution in a reasoned manner. 92 i
examining the standards necessary to reach a decision, the court noted that
a case is manageable if relief can be granted in a reasoned manner rather
than allowing a claim to proceed based on a hope for a ruling.93 With this,
and a determination that the fact finder would have to weigh energy
alternatives and their respective impact, quality, and safety, the court held
that a lack of standards existed that would enable the court to resolve
Kivalina's nuisance claims in a reasoned manner. 94 Of note, in reaching
8 7 Id. (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 240 (1993)).
" Id. at 873.
89 id.
90 Id.
91 Id.9 2 Id. at 876.
9 Id. (citing Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 552 (9th Cir. 2005)).
94Id. at 873-77. In discussing the alternatives to oil and gas energy sources, the court
examined discussions in Calfornia v. General Motors Corp. See Gen. Motors, No. C06-
05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (Sept. 17, 2007).
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the determination that there were a lack of standards for resolving the
nuisance claim presented, the court dismissed9 5 AEP's holding and
precedent in favor of adjudication because the court found the
environmental injuries and factual patterns to be distinguishable. 96
Next, the court turned to the second prong, whether initial policy
determinations would need to be made that would be more appropriate for
the political branches. 97 Here, the court had little trouble in finding that a
policy determination would need to be made. Reasoning that a political
question occurs if the court has to make a policy judgment legislative in
nature, the court held that because Kivalina's claims required the court to
decide who should bear the cost of global warming, Kivalina's claims
were nonjusticiable.99
B. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing
Next, the court turned to the question of whether Kivalina had
standing to bring suit against the Defendants, specifically looking to the
causation requirement of standing. 00  In breaking the causation
requirement into three prongs, (1) Defendants' contribution to the injury,
(2) the "Seed" of the injury, and (3) the Zone of Discharge, the court held
that Kivalina did not have standing to bring suit. First, in examining
whether the Defendant contributed to Kivalina's injury, because Kivalina
conceded that it could not trace the alleged injury to the Defendants,
Kivalina needed to show that (1) the Defendants contributed to Kivalina's
injury and (2) a congressionally prescribed limitation existed in which the
9s The court dismissed AEP's holding rather than overruling it because the courts are in
different federal circuits. The Northern District of California, where Kivalina was
decided, is within the Ninth Circuit. AEP was decided in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.
96 Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 875-76.
97 Id. at 876.
98 Id. at 877.
" Id. at 876-77 (citing EEOC v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 400 F.3d 774, 784 (9th Cir. 2005)
(stating that a political question "exists when ... the court must make a policy judgment
of a legislative nature, rather than resolving the dispute through legal and factual
analysis.")).
1 Id. at 877 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997)).
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Defendant exceeded causing such injury to occur. ot In finding that
Kivalina could not point to any federal standard limiting the discharge of
greenhouse gases, the court held Kivalina could not show that the
Defendant contributed to Kivalina's injury. 102
Second, the court stated that even if the contribution theory was
met, Kivalina did not allege that the seed of its injury could be traced to
any of the Defendants. 03 The court reasoned that Kivalina did not trace
the injury to the Defendants, as a multitude of other potential defendants
existed and specific emissions by the Defendants (1) could not be
identified and (2) could not be traced to the Defendants.104 Third, in
examining whether the zone of discharge prong was met, the court
examined whether Kivalina's injury could be fairly traced to the
Defendants. Here, the court held that the injuries could not be fairly
traced, as it is impossible to trace the path of greenhouse gas emission and
Kivalina's injuries are far removed both in space and time from the
Defendants' alleged discharge.106
V. COMMENT
Two lessons, and corresponding conclusions, can be drawn from
an analysis of the Kivalina decision. First, the current state of political
question jurisprudence (in relation to global warming) and political
gridlock in Washington leads one to the conclusion that a plaintiff has a
hard road ahead for an adequate remedy. This conclusion is readily seen
when the overall malaise of global warming regulation and adjudication is
examined. Second, in order to combat the current frustration in the
Judicial Branch's treatment of global warming adjudication, creativity in
pleading a claim is necessary. o7  Therefore, in order for plaintiffs to
'o' Id. at 878-80.
102Id. at 880.
'
03 Id. at 880-81.
104Id.
1os id.
1o' Id. at 881-82.
107 Sadly (for me), the idea of creativity to combat malaise is not mine nor new. A well-
known articulation of how to creatively cure a public policy problem was penned by
Professor Philip Harter nearly thirty years ago. See generally Error! Reference
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succeed in bringing global warming suits, the terms of the complaint need
to be framed in a precedent-friendly manner.
A. Lesson 1 - The Frustrations for Global Warming Plaintiffs
1. Political Question Frustration
The Supreme Court has found that a political question bars
adjudication only twice since the Baker decision created the modem
political question test.1o8 Given this consideration, it seems odd that
global warming plaintiffs have faced such resistance at the hands of the
political question analysis. The circuit split nature of AEP, GM, Comer,
and Kivalina have left global warming plaintiffs with a truly uncertain
environment to attempt to seek redress. Specifically, a plaintiff must
speculate whether (A) a court will accept persuasive language in AEP
discussing the necessity for courts to view the global warming issue as
among those the federal common law allows for adjudication' 9 or (B)
whether a court will find Kivalina's pronouncement specifically against
AEP's decision to apply similar law and fact patterns as conclusive."10
The analysis is additionally frustrated by the fact that the political question
doctrine is one of limited application and applied in a case-by-case
source not found., Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1
(1982).
108 Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine & the Rise ofJudicial Supremacy, 102 COLuM. L. REv. 237, 267-68 (2002).
109 See Connecticut v. Amer. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d 309, 330-31 (2d Cir. 2009).
("Similarly, the fact that the Clean Air Act ("CAA") or other air pollution statutes, as
they now exist, do not provide Plaintiffs with the remedy they seek does not mean that
Plaintiffs cannot bring an action and must wait for the political branches to craft a
"comprehensive" global solution to global warming. Rather, Plaintiffs here may seek
their remedies under the federal common law. They need not await an "initial policy
determination" in order to proceed on this federal common law of nuisance claim, as such
claims have been adjudicated in federal courts for over a century.")
"oSee Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 875. ("This Court is not so sanguine [in referring to
the AEP court]. While such principles may provide sufficient guidance in some novel
cases, this is not one of them.").
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manner,111 and the other courts tend to weigh some cases as heavier than
others with no mandate to do so.112 Given the numerous inconsistencies
among the lower federal courts' decisions, the issue seems prime for the
Supreme Court to determine conclusively" 3 that global warming costs are
political in nature or that they are within the realm of judicial adjudication.
However, these avenues might be deadly for the global warming
plaintiff s cause.
2. Political Branch Frustration - the Inaction of the Legislative and
Executive Branch
Due to the Massachusetts holding, the EPA was directed to initiate
rulemaking unless it concluded that greenhouse gases did not contribute to
climate change or provided an explanation found in the statute that
justified the EPA not determining the possibility of greenhouse gases'
contribution.114 Subsequently, under the policies set forth in the Obama
Administration, the EPA is moving closer to regulating greenhouse gases
regardless of a Congressional decision to pass global warming emission
standards." 5 However, although these policies are now in place, inaction
still persists.
A Washington Post article on December 8, 2009 detailed an EPA
announcement that the agency would initiate rulemaking to reduce
in1 See James R. May, Climate Change, Constitutional Consignment, and the Political
Question Doctrine, 85 DENV. U. L. REv. 919, 933 (2008).
112 This variance is due to the fact that cases decided by different circuit courts of appeal
are persuasive but not precedent.
113 The Supreme Court has taken cases to resolve a circuit split. See Hartman v. Moore,
547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) ("We granted certiorari to resolve the Circuit split and now
reverse."); Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739, 743 (2004) ("We
granted certiorari in order to resolve the resulting Circuit Split and now affirm"); Bank of
Am. Nat. Trust and Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 443 (1999)
("We granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit Split on the issue.").
114 Gillen, supra note 39, at 25.
115 Steven Mufson & David A. Fahrenthold, EPA is Preparing to Regulate Emissions in
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emissions of six gases, including carbon dioxide."' 6 Largely a response to
the Massachusetts ruling and the Senate's inaction in passing the "cap and
trade" legislation, the EPA's decision was met with hostility and anger
among the Senators.l17  Since this announcement, lawsuits and
Congressional posturing have eroded support for the EPA's movement
toward emission regulation." 8 At the same time, while "cap and trade"
legislation passed the House, the legislation was met with opposition in
the Senate and eventually died a slow, but inevitable death. On February
27th, 2010, the Washington Post reported that Senator Lindsey Graham (R
- S.C.) declared the legislation dead. 119 A blow to environmental
regulation, Senators Graham, John Kerry (D - Mass.) and Joseph
Lieberman (I - Conn.) were developing a Senate alternative to the House
bill that would be able to get through the chamber while satisfying the
House leadership.120 As of the time of writing l21, no alternative plan has
been announced.
The culmination of pro-environmental regulation frustration
occurred on March 29, 2010.122 Answering the questions posed by
commentators as cap and trade legislation became increasingly likely to
fail,123 the EPA's announcement detailed several findings and stated that it
"16Id.
117 id.
11 See Bradford Plummer, Can Lawsuits Stop The EPA's Carbon Rules?, (Feb. 21,
2010), available at http://www.tnr.com/print/blog/the-vine/can-lawsuits-stop-the-epas-
carbon-rules.




121 Final draft of this note submitted April 18, 2010.
122 Juliet Eilperin, EPA Affirms Delay in Regulating Power Plant Emissions, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 29, 2010, available at
http://views.washingtonpost.com/climate-change/post-
carbon/2010/03/epa _toissuejohnson memo.html.
123 Bradford Plumer, The Substitute, (Feb. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.tnr.com/print/article/politics/the-substitute (questioning whether the EPA can
handle climate change policies if climate change legislation dies).
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would not regulate power plant and vehicle emissions under the Clean Air
Act until January 2, 2011.124
3. Judicial Frustration - Standing Frustration and the Possibility of
Conservative Judicial Activism
In examining the court's standing holding, Kivalina suffers from a
misinterpretation in the Massachusetts v. EPA decision that has
subsequently led other decisions astray.12 5 By focusing on the causation
requirement, the Kivalina opinion seizes on the Plaintiff s claim - that they
only need to show the Defendants contributed to the Plaintiffs injuries in
order to have standing - to show that the standing test could not be met.126
While the court's discussion of the "contribution to the injury" standard is
correct, as is their "seed of the injury" discussion, the opinion's reasoning
when discussing the "zone of discharge" requirement is flawed on the
grounds that it assumes that the link is too weak between the Defendants'
actions and the Plaintiff s claim.
In citing Biological Diversity's holding, that a casual link between
government approval of offshore leases and gas and oil development is too
tenuous to demonstrate a climate change standing claim, the court uses
precedent that misinterprets Massachusetts.127 In addition to referencing a
124 EPA, RECONSIDERATION OF INTERPRETATION OF REGULATIONS THAT DETERMINE
POLLUTANTS COVERED BY CLEAN AIR ACT PERMITTrING PROGRAMS, Mar. 29, 2010,
available at http://www.epa.gov/nsr/documents/psd memorecon_032910.pdf.
125 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). The Massachusetts decision has been
misinterpreted in Comer v. Murphy USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), and Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dept. ofInterior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009). For a more
thorough analysis of the misinterpretation of the Massachusetts decision, see Michael A.
Moorefield, Note, Have the Sons Disobeyed their Fathers? The Massachusetts Standing
Analysis after Biological Diversity, 17 Mo. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 391 (2010). Briefly,
the issue with Biological Diversity, Comer, and now Kivalina's interpretation of
Massachusetts is that subsequent courts almost dismiss the analysis of Massachusetts as
solely being relevant to sovereign entities and not generally applicable to general
standing law principles. Therefore, the Massachusetts holding, and its subsequent legal
precedent, have been viewed as a "carve out" to a special situation rather than legal
precedent for standing analysis. See id.
126Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 881.
127 Id. at 881-82 (citing Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 478).
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questionable decision, the opinion is relying on a statement that is not
directly applicable to the question at hand.12 8 In Biological Diversity, the
court's holding was focused not on whether the subsequent oil companies
were at fault for the global warming consequences of the ice melting, but
rather whether the Department of Interior failed to follow several statutory
mandated processes in assessing the prospective leases' environmental
impact.129 Therefore, Kivalina's analysis into Biological Diversity's
relevance is at best secondary support.
More directly to Kivalina's fact pattern, the Plaintiff did not help
its cause by stating that "the relevant geographical area should be the
entire world" when looking to the zone of discharge. 130 But the holding of
Massachusetts remains, as the Supreme Court determined that the State
had standing and was able to successfully bring suit due to a loss of
shoreline when glaciers melted due to an increase in greenhouse gases.
An honest analysis of the fact patterns of Kivalina and Massachusetts
should lead a court to the conclusion that due to Massachusetts, the
Village's theory of causation should survive standing analysis.
Kivalina's interpretation of Massachusetts. highlights the
implications of an issue being discussed in both the media and legal
academia throughout the past few years - the possibility of Supreme Court
judicial activism.' 3 ' On the final day of the 2006 term, Justice Breyer
stated "It's not often in the law that so few have so quickly changed so
much." 32  Justice Breyer was not alone in this sentiment, as many
1281d. at 882.
129 See Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d 466.130 Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 881.
131 For example, the New York Times published an Op-Ed entitled Last Term's Winner at
the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism in 2007 that pointed out the inconsistency between
the conservative judicial philosophy ofjudicial restraint and the Op-Ed author's opinion
of what the Roberts Court has actually done. Adam Cohen, Last Term 's Winner at the
Supreme Court: Judicial Activism, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/09/opinion/09mon4.html. From a legal academia
perspective, law schools have held various symposiums to address the issue. See, e.g.,
Symposium, Precedent and the Roberts Court, Methodologies for Analyzing Precedent
and the Roberts Court, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1107 (2008).
132 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 803
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (this statement was made in Justice Breyer's oral dissent),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_908/opinion/.
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commentators echoed the Court's perceived active movement to the
Right.'33 This quotation is most recently exemplified by the outcry over
judicial activism in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission from
liberal commentators, the dissenting opinion of the decision, and legal
scholars who questioned the continued philosophy of an interpretation,
and not creation, of law that the Roberts Court claims to follow.134 in
probably the most famous commentary on the Court's decision, President
Obama stated in his first State of the Union Address: "'With all due
deference to separation of powers,'... 'last week the Supreme Court
reversed a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special
interests, including foreign corporations, to spend without limit in our
elections."'l 35 What becomes clear is not a specific presence of evidence
showing environmental litigation activism, but the general emerging
pattern of judicial inconsistency that could be viewed as judicial activism.
The Supreme Court's decisions have increasingly been criticized as
political in nature and motivated by an agenda. Therefore, given the fact
that global warming litigation is trending toward an increased frequency of
suit, plaintiffs should be aware not only of the legal precedent but the
political opinion of global warming and carbon dioxide emission. This is
truly a troubling revelation, as courts could be denying the adjudication of
suits based on a political question analysis in one instance, but deciding
others based on an agenda in another situation.
133 See Lee Epstein et al., On the Capacity of the Roberts Court to Generate
Consequential Precedent, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1299 (2008).
134 See 130 S. Ct. 876 (2009). For a brief analysis of the decision and commentary of its
impact, see http://www.scotuswiki.com/index.php?title=Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission. Probably the most quoted passage from the dissenting opinion
concerning the Court's decision came from Justice Stevens, when he stated, "Under the
majority's view, I suppose it may be the First Amendment's problem that corporations
are not permitted to vote, given that voting is, among other things, a form of speech."
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 948 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13 President Barack Obama, 2010 State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), transcript
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/us/politics/28obama.text.html.
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B. Lesson 2 - Creativity in Argument Articulation as a Solution
1. The Way a Legal Argument is Framed Matters
The concept of framing gained the attention of both political
parties after the November 2004 presidential election.' 36 Previously, only
the Republican Party, under the direction of pollster Frank Luntz, fully
understood the importance not of the message itself but how the message
was communicated. However, when the Democratic Party's candidate,
John Kerry, lost the presidential election, the Party started to assess
whether their message was the reason or whether the way they
communicated the message was the problem.' 37
Framing is particularly useful when structuring legal arguments
with policy undertones. In a NY Times article, an attorney discussing
138Zellman v. Simmons-Harris , a 2002 Supreme Court decision, said the
following:
One of our strategies was to distill the message, not only
for the [C]ourt but in the court of public opinion . . . We
wanted to make sure this was seen not as a case about
religion but about education. If the [C]ourt perceived it as
a religion case, then we would be in serious trouble. If [the
Court] saw it as an education case, then we would win.139
In short, framing really matters. The way an argument is framed before a
court can determine how the issue is adjudicated and if it will even allow
for adjudication.
'
36 Matt Bai, The Framing Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 17, 2005, at 1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/17/magazine/I7DEMOCRATS.html.
138 536 U.S. 639 (2002).




&st-cse. The attorney's side did win, in a 5-4 decision.
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2. Framing the Legal Argument - What Global Warming Plaintiffs Can
Do to Win Political Question Inquiries
Given the political roadblocks that have frustrated the direction of
post-Massachusetts environmental regulation, it appears that the only
viable litigation strategy for global warming plaintiffs currently is the tort
based nuisance claims found in Kivalina. The second Baker factor - that
constitutionally discoverable and manageable standards are required to
suffice one of six factors in the Baker analysis - is prudential in nature. 140
Baker Factor Two is, then, essentially a requirement that looks to previous
case law, statutory standards, and other available legal resources to
evaluate the particular claim in question. If global warming plaintiffs can
develop positive case law akin to Comer and AEP's argument articulation,
Baker Factor Two becomes a potent weapon for the global warming
plaintiff.
Additionally, opportunities exist in Kivalina specifically'41 and the
GM decision generally to frame the decisions as flawed. Consistent with
sound political question doctrine principles, the court found that a policy
determination existed in determining who should bear the cost of global
warming.142 However, the court went on to state that the allocation of
fault and cost of global warming is a matter appropriately left to the
Executive and Legislative Branches.143 Both prongs of this sentence - that
(1) fault and (2) costs should be left to the other branches - are
questionable. The first prong is questionable due to the truth of the
statement and the second is due to the policy determination that the court,
itself, needed to make.
First, the notion that the Judiciary cannot allocate fault for global
warming is simply wrong. Massachusetts has clearly shown that not only
can the Judiciary find fault for harm caused by global warming, they can
also do so when this harm was caused by greenhouse gas emissions.
Second, although an analysis of the costs of global warming is certainly a
political question in nature, courts should consider exploring the particular
140 May, supra note 111, at 940.
141 See Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 876-77.
142 id .
143 Id. at 877.
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barriers to the political question of who bears the cost of global warming.
While the Judicial Branch is not in the business of rulemaking, it is in the
business of protecting an individual's rights if other branches are not, or
are failing to do so.
VI. CONCLUSION
Global warming is the biggest policy issue of our time. While
groups and individuals can bicker about the best way to address global
warming and its effects, no responsible individual can flatly deny
advocates all avenues for resolution. Given the political question
doctrine's use in preventing pro-plaintiff global warming litigation,
Kivalina serves both as an example of the purpose and consequence of the
doctrine. As a model of the doctrine's purpose, Kivalina's central issue -
who bears the cost of global warming harm - provides an illustration of the
types of issues that are inappropriate for judicial resolution. However, as
an example of how the political question doctrine can lead a court to
dismiss a plaintiffs federal common law claims, Kivalina shows how the
doctrine's tendency to be used as a hatchet rather than more appropriately
as a scalpel.
It remains to be seen whether Washington will be able to provide
the avenue for debate the topic of global warming responsibility deserves.
Case law is split on the issue, and a comprehensive jurisprudence is
needed in order to guide global warming litigation in the future. But with
closure comes a dangerous game of Russian roulette for global warming
plaintiffs. The choice between the suspiciously active Supreme Court and
the now inactive Political Branch is a flip of the coin at best, and the death
of environmental adjudication and regulation at worst.
MICHAEL A. MOOREFIELD
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